This study investigates whether U.S. property-liability insurers change their demand for reinsurance after demutualization. We find that converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers, but increase the demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers after the conversion. One possible explanation is that converting insurers may treat reinsurance to affiliated reinsurers as risk retention rather than risk transfer so that they can reduce reinsurance cost. Our empirical results show that the overall demand for reinsurance of converting insurers is not statistically different after the conversion. One other interesting finding is that converting insurers increase demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers before conversion.
Data and Variables Description
We use recent property-liability conversions during 1990-2004 as our sample.
Appendix 1 presents the list of the demutualization sample insurers. Financial data for the insurance companies are obtained from the NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) Property and Casualty Database. We include only those samples with complete data during the entire sample period and thus consider only 36 demutualization insurers. 1 The reason for using a 15-year sample period but not longer is that we can evaluate the changes in the demand for reinsurance of demutualized insurers based on homogeneous economic conditions.
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For each demutualized insurer, we select its matching insurers from mutual insurers on basis of commercial lines ratio as well as the firm assets. Specifically, we follow a variation of matching procedure of Barber and Lyon (1996) and Nohel and Tarhan (1998) . By using two dimensions (commercial lines ratio and size) sample selection method, we reduce sample selection bias. The demand for reinsurance is often driven by product mix. Thus, we first choose matching insurers on the basis of commercial line ratio and then further control the size to determine the final matching samples. 3 Specifically, the restrictions, where percentages are potential deviation from converting firm's value, are as follows: commercial 1 For the 36 demutualization firms in Appendix 1, the conversion years for 1991-1999 are identified in Viswanathan and Cummins (2003) , whereas those for 2000-2003 are identified from Best's Insurance Reports-Property-Liability. Not all demutualized firms from Viswanathan and Cummins (2003) appear herein because only the demutualized firms with all available data are adopted. 2 For more detailed discussion, see Viswanathan and Cummins (2003) .
lines positive/negative 1.5 percent, size positive/negative 1.5%. 4 As a result, for each demutualized insurer, we identify 6 mutual matching insurers. Thus, we can compare the changes of demand for reinsurance between the demutualized insurers and their counterpart matching insurers before and after the demutualization.
While prior studies which use reinsurance ratios to measure the demand for reinsurance (Mayers and Smith (1990) ; Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) ; Cole and McCullough (2006) ), we use the changes in reinsurance ratios as dependent variables. Specifically, ∆ (reins_ratio) 5 represents the changes of reinsurance ratio where reins_ratio is (affiliated reinsurance ceded + nonaffiliated reinsurance ceded)/(direct business written plus reinsurance assumed). However, Powell and Sommer (2007) suggest that reinsurance ratio may be biased because it double counts premium and retroceded in inter-company pooling arrangement. To avoid this problem, we also separate the effect of reinsurance transfer of affiliated reinsurers from non-affiliated reinsurers. Specifically, we define ∆ (reins_non_ratio) and ∆ (reins_aff_ratio) as the changes in reins_non_ratio measured by (nonaffiliated reinsurance ceded)/(direct business written plus reinsurance assumed) and reins_aff_ratio measured by (affiliated reinsurance ceded)/(direct business written plus reinsurance assumed), respectively. 6 The above two variables also allow us to test whether the converting insurers demand more reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers and/or non-affiliated reinsurers.
Previous research also suggests several firm-specific characteristics, in addition to organizational form, may affect the demand for reinsurance (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough 2006) . We define our explanatory variables based on the characteristics accordingly.
First of all, the main explanatory variable, demutualized firm dummy variable (demutual_firm dummy) equals 1 if the insurer is the demutualized insurer and 0 otherwise.
We use this dummy variable to test the main research hypothesis.
With regard to bankruptcy characteristics, we use three variables. First, firm size (lnasset), the natural logarithm admitted assets, is used as a proxy of the firm size (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Weiss and Chung, 2004; Cole and McCullough, 2006) . Prior studies predict that firm size has a negative impact on the demand for reinsurance, because small insurers should purchase more reinsurance to reduce their probability of bankruptcy. Second, Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) and Cole and McCullough (2006) predict a positive relationship between direct business written to surplus and demand for reinsurance. Insurers writing more business relative to their surplus should have a higher insolvency probability and therefore have greater demand for reinsurance. As a proxy for leverage, we consider the direct business written to surplus (leverage). 7 Third, we use two-year loss development (2_years_loss) 8 to measure potential financial constraints (Petroni, 1992; Weiss, 1985; Grace, 1990; Christensen, Hoyt, and Paterson, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 1999; Cole and McCullough, 2006 ). An insurer with a positive loss development (under loss reserving) needs more reinsurance to mitigate its potential financial constraints, whereas an insurer with a negative loss development (over loss reserving) would have less demand for reinsurance. Thus, insurers that adjust their loss reserving will change their demand for reinsurance to target their financial objectives.
To control for profitability, we use return on assets (roa) 9 to measure the profitability of insurers on the basis of their net investment gain divided by assets. Insurers that earn more profits are better able to face losses and financial pressures and thus demand less reinsurance contracts, according to Mayers and Smith (1990) , Powell and Sommer (2002) , Mayers and Smith (2004) , and Cole and McCullough (2006) .
In addition, we incorporate tax-exempt investment income relative to total investment income (tax_ex) as a proxy for the expected tax liability or tax-favored assets (D'Arcy and Garven, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 2006) . The structure 7 Many prior studies also use liabilities-to-equity as a proxy for bankruptcy. For consistent comparison, we follow Cole and McCullough (2006) and use direct business written to surplus in this paper. 8 The variable equals the development of estimated losses and loss expenses incurred two years before the current and prior year, scaled by policyholders' surplus. The data come from the five-year historical page of the NAIC Property-Casualty Database. 9 Other studies also use ROE (return on equity) or ROC (return on capital) to measure profitability. We rely on Cole and McCullough's (2006) ROA definition to examine the relationship between profitability and demand for reinsurance for consistency. The use of ROA instead of ROE or ROC is plausible.
of a tax code affects insurers' demand for reinsurance. On the one hand, insurers can reduce their earnings' volatility by purchasing more reinsurance and thereby reduce their expected tax liability (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Smith and Stulz, 1985) . In addition, purchasing reinsurance can mitigate the effects of large unexpected losses and advantage from investment in tax-favored assets (Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003) . As a result, insurers that purchase more reinsurance contracts can reduce their expected tax liabilities and benefit from tax-favored assets. and/or unexpected losses to insurers but also supply real services in terms of specialized knowledge and economies of scale. Consequently,, if insurers issue policies in multiple lines of business and/or diverse geographic area, they may have a higher incentive to purchase more reinsurance because the more reinsurance they purchase, the more services the reinsurers provide. 12 As a result, from real services hypothesis, a less business-or geography-concentrated insurer may demand more reinsurance. On the other hand, a reinsurance contract offers a mechanism to increase the diversification of risk for insurers.
From the viewpoint of risk diversification, insurers with a higher concentration in a given line of business or geographic area may have a higher incentive to purchase more reinsurance.
Thus, high levels of concentration may prompt greater demand for reinsurance. In contrast, if insurers issue policies in multiple lines of business and/or diverse geographic area, then the insurers may have a lower incentive to purchase more reinsurance (Cole and McCullough (2006) ). As a result, a higher business-or geography-concentrated insurer may demand more reinsurance. According to these conflicting expectations, the influence of business concentration and geographic concentration is ambiguous. Cole and McCullough (2006) separate affiliated and non-affiliated firms in their samples and control for the systematic differences with a single dummy variable; we use the dummy variable to control for the difference between affiliated and non-affiliated firms. We also include a group dummy, single (single), to indicate an affiliated insurer or non-affiliated insurer, such that it equals 1 if the insurer is non-affiliated and 0 if it is affiliated. Insurers that belong to a group should demand more reinsurance, which enables them to shift profits within the group and reduce tax payments. Finally, we use premiums written in each line of business in the model 13 to control for the impact of variations in lines of business on the demand for reinsurance. Mayers and Smith (1990) and Cole and McCullough (2006) control for these variation effects in the different lines of business of their models because some lines of business may have particular effects on the demand for reinsurance, such as liability-related lines, in which higher agency costs give the insurer greater incentive to purchase more reinsurance.
Regression Model
To examine whether demutualized insurers change their demand for reinsurance after conversion, we analyze the changes of the reinsurance ratio for the period of three years before and after conversion (i.e., t= -1, -2, -3, and t =3, 2, 1 ). We also make pair comparisons between the converting insurers and their mutual matching insurers before and after conversion.
To further analyze how converting insurers change their demand for reinsurance, we conduct regression analyses. As suggested by Studenmund (1997) and Esho et al. (2004) , potential feedback effects and selection effect may require the application of simultaneous equations framework. To avoid the possible endogenous problems and sample selection bias simultaneously, we construct a two-stage selection regression model. The model also includes firm-specific factors and other important control variables used in the literature. Panel data 13 We measure this variable as the ratios of premiums written in each line of business to premiums written in all 27 lines of business. To avoid a singular matrix in the regression, Mayers and Smith (1990) and Cole and McCullough (2006) suggest the model should exclude the financial guaranty, international, and reinsurance lines.
method is used to examine the hypothesis proposed in previous section. Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) provide a nonparametric estimation of sample selection models for controlling these problems. 14 We follow their concept and construct the regression model as follows:
In the first stage, the selection equation is a binary response model as follows, In the second stage, the regression model is setup as follows,
where Y denotes the changes of the reinsurance ratio and is a N 2 T 2 × 1 vector with cross-sectional unit i = 1, …, N 2 , and time-series unit j = 1, …, T 2 . X 2 is a N 2 T 2 × K 2 matrix, and there are K 2 explanatory variables indexed by k = 1, …, K 2 . In addition, X 2 represents the independent variables mentioned in the previous section and error correction terms from selection model, and α is a K 2 × 1 vector that represents the coefficients of K 2 explanatory 14 Klaauw and Koning (2003) provide a parametric estimation for sample selection model. They assume that the error terms of selection model and of regression model follow a bivariate normal distribution.
variables. Finally, ε is N 2 T 2 × 1 vector and refers to the disturbance terms following i.i.d.
ND(0, σ 2 2 ).
Following Das, Newey, and Vella (2003), we use the cross-validation (CV) criterion to decide our needing specifications. 15 The CV criterion is the sum of squares of predicted residuals. By using CV to minimize asymptotic mean-square error, where the bias goes to zero at the same rate as the standard deviation, we have the best fitted unbiased estimation in the regression model.
Empirical Results
We report changes in the demand for reinsurance for converting and matching insurers in Table 1 . Following Viswanathan and Cummins (2003), we consider one year before demutualization (t = -1) as the benchmark year. The results show that for overall reinsurance ratio, converting insurers increase their demand for reinsurance before conversion. For example, the mean of changes in demand for overall reinsurance at t = -1 is 4.1% higher than at t = -3. The results also show that converting insurers decrease their demand for overall reinsurance at t = 0 and t= 1, but increase the demand at t = 2 and t = 3 after conversion. For example, the mean of changes in demand for overall reinsurance at t = 0 is 0.5% lower than at t = -1.
When we separate the demand for reinsurance of affiliated reinsurer from the demand 15 As Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) suggested, we add error term in each regression model, including error term, the square of error term, and the cube of error term which from the first-stage probit model (selection model). Therefore, we have overall 7 different regression models. The CV criterion is the sum of squares of predicted residuals. Consequently, the minimize CV model is the best fitted model.
for reinsurance of non-affiliated reinsurer, the results show that converting insurers decrease their demand for non-affiliated reinsurers after conversion. Specifically, Table 1 shows the changes in reinsurance for converting insurers (relative to t = -1) is -2.7%, -3.4%, -5.2%, and -4.5% at t = 0, 1, 2, 3, respectively. On the other hand, the results also show that converting insurers increase their demand for affiliated reinsurance after conversion. In other words, the increase in demand for reinsurance is driven by the increase in demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurer after conversion.
In addition to time-series comparisons, we also report the comparisons between the converting insurer and their matching mutual insurers. The evidence shows that converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers whereas matching insurers increase the demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers. The evidence also shows that converting insurers increase more demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers than the matching insurers. These results reinforce our conclusion that converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers, but increase demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers.
[Insert Table 1 here] Tables 2 reports the summary statistics of the independent variables used in our regression analysis. The equal mean T test is implemented to check whether or not the mean of these independent variables are significant different between converting insurers and their matching insurers. We find that, comparing with the mutual matching insurers, the characteristics of converting insurers are similar to those of matching insurers with few exceptions. First, converting insurers have lower geographic concentration relative to mutual matching insurers before and after conversion. Second, converting insurers are less likely to be a non-affiliated insurer after conversion. Overall, most of the means of the variables in Table 2 are similar to those in prior studies (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 2006) .
[Insert Table 2 here]
The results of Table 1 do not control for firm's characteristics. We perform a two-stage selection regression analysis to further examine the issue. The results of the regression analysis are showed in Table 3 , when matching insurers are mutuals. Panel A shows the coefficient of demutual_firm dummy is negative and significant when the changes in demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers is the dependent variable. On the other hand, the coefficient is positive and significant when the changes in demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers is the dependent variable. Not surprisingly, the coefficient of demutual_firm dummy is not significant when the changes in overall reinsurance ratio is the dependent variable. The overall evidence suggests that converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance from the non-affiliated reinsurers, but increase the demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers after conversions. However, the overall demand for reinsurance is not statistically different after conversion.
Other major findings in Table 3 are reported below. The interaction term between demutualized dummy and return on assets variable is negatively correlated to overall demand for reinsurance. This result implies that converting insurers with higher profits decrease overall reinsurance after conversion. We find the coefficient of the interaction term between demutualized dummy and leverage variable is positive and significant when the changes in demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers is the dependent variable, but the coefficient is negative and significant when the changes in demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers is the dependent variable. This is an interesting finding. It implies that converting insurers with higher leverage would increase their demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers but decrease from affiliated reinsurers after conversions. One possible explanation is that high leveraged converting insurers increase their demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers and decrease from affiliated reinsurers to protect themselves from bankruptcy.
We also find converting insurers with high business-concentrated insurers increase their demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers after conversion. Finally, consistent with the literature, we find the coefficient of the interaction term between demutualized dummy and firm size is negative and significant, implying large converting insurers decrease their demand for reinsurance after conversions.
One may argue that the result that converting insurers decrease their demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsures because of the substitution effect of more capital after the conversion. To test whether our finding is entirely due to the substitution, we replace lnasset with lnequity. In other words, we control for the effect of more capital after the conversion. The results are presented in Panel B, Table 3 . The results of Panel B are very similar to those of Panel A. Thus, the decrease in demand for reinsurance is not due to the substitution effect.
It should be noted that the above results are consistent with those of the literature. Two possible reasons are discussed below. First, most previous studies use cross-sectional data of all insurers, whereas we use panel data related to converting and their matching insurers.
Second, instead of the reinsurance ratio used in the previous studies, we consider the changes of reinsurance ratio as the dependent variable in our model and separate the demand for reinsurance into two categories: affiliated reinsurers and non-affiliated reinsurers.
In addition to the changes of reinsurance ratio, we further use the logarithm value of the changes of reinsurance ratio as a proxy for the demand for reinsurance as a robustness check. 16 In general, the main results of the logarithm value model are consistent with the results in Table 3 and not tabulated here.
[Insert Table 3 here]
We also analyze the reinsurance behavior before converting. To save space, we only tabulate the main results of the regression analyses which is shown in Table 4 . We do not perform the two-stage selection regression model for this analysis since there is no selection bias problem in the matching group. Table 4 shows that demutualized insurers significantly increase their demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers before converting than the mutual controlling insurers.
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This result is interesting because we find the demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers is lower after the conversion while the demand from non-affiliated reinsurers is higher before conversion. A possible reason is that demutualization needs to be approved by policyholders and regulators. Managers may increase their demand for reinsurance to show the insurers have low risk before the approval of policyholders and regulators. Increasing demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers would appear more creditable than from affiliated reinsurers before the conversion. After the conversion, the converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance because they no longer need the approval.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Robustness of Results
Whether mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities have an impact on the demand for reinsurance is an important question because insurers may reduce the demand for reinsurance when they become a large insurer after demutualizations. To further investigate this issue, we categorize our whole sample into M&A insurers sample and non-M&A insurers sample.
We identify 8 demutualized insurers who initialized the converting process for M&A purpose and exclude them from our sample. The regression results for non-M&A insurers sample are reported in Table 5 and are similar to those of Table 3 . We find that the demutualized insurers significantly decrease their demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers, but increase from affiliated reinsurers after conversion.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Conclusions
This study investigates whether converting property-liability insurers change their demand for reinsurance after conversion. Our regression results cannot reject the hypothesis that converting insurers reduce their demand for reinsurance after conversion. When we categorize the reinsurance purchase decision into two sources: from non-affiliated reinsurers and from affiliated reinsurers. We find that converting insurers decrease the demand for reinsurance from the non-affiliated reinsurers, but increase the demand for reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers after conversion. The result is robust when the sample is consists of only non-M&A insurers. A possible explanation is converting insurers try to reduce total reinsurance costs through the purchase of reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers.
converting insurers use more reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers than their mutual counterparts before their conversion. This result is in contrast to the result of the demand for reinsurance after conversion. Our conjecture is that converting insurers use more reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers to improve their financial statements such that the conversion can be approved by policyholders and regulator before their conversion.
Other major findings are summarized below. First, the evidence implies that converting insurers with higher profits decrease overall reinsurance after conversions.
Second, we find that converting insurers with higher leverage would increase demand for reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers but decrease from affiliated reinsurers after conversions. One possible explanation is that converting insurers try to protect themselves from bankruptcy. Finally, the evidence shows that firm size is negatively related to the demand for reinsurance.
